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Sawers: Original Misunderstandings: The Implications of Misreading Histor

ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF MISREADING HISTORY IN
JONES
Brian Sawers*
ABSTRACT
This article shines light on a little-noticed but important error in
United States v. Jones, the recent Supreme Court Fourth Amendment
decision. In Jones, the majority opinion and Justice Alito’s
concurrence quibble whether the majority applies “18th-century tort
law” in holding that the government’s trespass constitutes a search.
Both opinions mistakenly assert that any unwanted intrusion on
private property was actionable at common law. While true in
England, the American law of trespass provided no remedy for
unwanted intrusions to unfenced land.
Current Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
recognizes the open fields doctrine, which allows the government to
search open land without a warrant. There is little indication at
present that the Supreme Court or any other court wants to overrule
the doctrine, so the Justices’ nonchalant approach to history could be
of no import to the scope of the Fourth Amendment. But the error
could have a serious impact on property law. In recent years, the
Supreme Court has exhibited a healthy appetite to both expanding the
regulatory takings doctrine and imposing a judicial takings doctrine
based on historical nonsense.

* Scholar in Residence, Emory Law School. I would like to thank Brandon Garrett, David Gray,
Lee Kovarsky, and Seth Tillman for their comments. I would like to thank Alyse Prawde for her
invaluable assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Before Katz v. United States, 1 a search under the Fourth
Amendment required a trespass. Without a trespass to one’s property,
no search took place.2 In Katz, a 1967 decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court abandoned that approach, and instead found a search where the
government invaded a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” 3 In
Oliver v. United States,4 the Court elaborated on how the two tests
relate. The Court found no reasonable expectation of privacy in open
fields, and thus no search, even though the defendant had erected
“No Trespassing” signs around his property to exclude the public,

1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. See id. at 353 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) and Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942)).
3. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
4. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
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consistent with state law.5 After Oliver, trespass no longer equated a
search.
In United States v. Jones,6 the latest case on Fourth Amendment
searches, the Court returned to the notion of trespass as a bar to a
warrantless search. The Court held that attaching an electronic
tracking device to Jones’s car constituted a trespass. Because
attaching the device constituted a trespass, it was a search, and the
government was required to obtain a warrant.7
The majority opinion and concurrences duel on whether reviving
trespass in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is wise, but all agree
that landowners always had the right to sue for trespasses on their
property, including open fields.8 Referencing Prosser and Keeton’s
treatise, Justice Alito’s concurrence asserts that “[a]t common law,
any unauthorized intrusion on private property was actionable.” 9
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia agrees that unauthorized entry
in private land constituted a trespass at common law.10
The justices and the treatise writers are indisputably right about the
common law of England. 11 The English law of trespass grants the
landowner a right to exclude from all private land, including empty
fields and standing timber. But, the justices are wrong about
American law. Landowners in early America could only exclude
others from their homes (and curtilage), and sometimes fenced land.
Landowners could not exclude from open land, and therefore,
unwanted visitors committed no trespass.
A review of eighteenth century trespass cases shows that unwanted
intrusions on open land unaccompanied by theft were not considered
trespasses. Additional evidence comes from contemporary hunting
5. Id. at 183–84. See also Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that
industrial plants were analogous to open fields, not a home’s curtilage).
6. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
7. Id. at 949–52.
8. Id. at 949, 958.
9. Id. at 958.
10. Id. at 949.
11. Brian Sawers, Keeping up with the Joneses: Making Sure Your History Is Just as Wrong as
Everyone Else’s, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 22 (2013) [hereinafter Sawers, Keeping
up].
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law. Hunting, especially on horseback with dogs, is more disruptive
than fishing or foraging, and so generated more lawmaking.
Constitutional and statutory protections for hunting, mining, and
resource gathering on open land reinforce the proposition that
landowners could not exclude unwanted visitors from unfenced land.
Hunting was not an exception to the rule. Instead, hunting was the
activity most likely to be restricted since the hunters were armed,
killed game the landowners might want for themselves, and hunting
dogs could harass livestock.12
In the first part, the Article notes that this is not the only historical
error in originalist jurisprudence. The second part discusses the scope
of the open fields doctrine and how it relates to trespass law. The
third part includes a review of American trespass cases from the
eighteenth century, the constitutional protections for public access to
private land, which necessarily limited trespass law, and colonial
statutes that augmented trespass law, thus delimiting its scope and
contours. The fourth part discusses the implications of faulty history
for Fourth Amendment and Takings jurisprudence. Conflating
English and American trespass laws has already produced a distorted
regulatory takings doctrine. In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 13 four justices
exhibited an unhealthy appetite to ban judicial takings. If courts are
going to decide cases today based on the law in 1791, then it is
important to get the history right.
I. HISTORICAL ERRORS IN ORIGINALIST JURISPRUDENCE
Originalism is an approach to constitutional interpretation that
“accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the
intentions of its adopters.” 14 It has been a major theme in the

12. Id. at 22.
13. 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
14. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204
(1980).
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American constitutional jurisprudence since Marbury v. Madison.15
While its importance has ebbed and flowed over the centuries, it has
acquired considerable prominence and significance since the 1980s,
first with the Reagan administration, and later with the appointment
of Justices Scalia and Thomas to the U.S. Supreme Court.
President Reagan’s Attorney General Edwin Meese announced
that his office would be committed to “a Jurisprudence of Original
Intention,”16 which Meese then described: “Our fundamental law is
the text of the Constitution as ratified, not the subjective intent or
purpose of any individual or group in adopting the provision at
issue.” 17 To determine what the text meant at ratification requires
historical analysis since many constitutional terms are no longer used
or their meaning has evolved.
“The originalist’s use of history is goal-directed.” 18 Originalists
want to understand the past in order to address the present. To echo
Professor Powell, “[t]here is nothing wrong with this utilitarian
interest in history, but it does pose a serious temptation for the
interpreter.” 19 Studying the past merely to understand it better
presents less temptation, since the student of history does not have a
modern ax to grind. Questions with well-defined and certain answers
present fewer opportunities for faulty interpretations. Where the zone
of uncertainty is large, as is the case with many areas of law, the
opportunities for misconduct by motivated lawyers are
correspondingly large. The legal zone of uncertainty is large because
the original intent as well as original meaning is often indeterminate.
Commentators concerned about originalism often point out that the
Framers disagreed on matters, including those of crucial
constitutional importance then and now. Even when they did agree,
15. In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall emphasized the significance of the fact that the Constitution
is a written document. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
16. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 553 (2003)
(citations omitted).
17. Id. at 554 (citations omitted). More accurately, this approach is textual since the text would
trump the original intention of the Framers.
18. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 669 (1987).
19. Id.
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the often limited historical record exposes the inherent and
inescapable limitations of originalism. The paucity of the historical
record does not often reflect lost history, in the same way that many
of the classics of antiquity are lost to history. Instead, the thin
historical record reflects that most of the questions of most interest to
us were not the questions of interest to the Framers. The hope that
history could provide the answer to contemporary problems presents
“the fundamental historical error of ignoring the past’s essential
autonomy. Put more concretely, the founders thought, argued,
reached decisions, and wrote about the issues that mattered to them,
not about our contemporary problems.” 20 Moreover, the
“Constitution very wisely precludes very few policy choices,” 21 it
bars anyone younger than thirty-five or born abroad from serving as
President.
Where the historical record is limited, originalism cannot supply
an answer to a modern problem. But often, originalists have
committed historical errors that are entirely avoidable. The historical
errors in Jones described in Part III are not isolated and lamentable
exceptions, but instead lamentably common. The scholarship and
jurisprudence of originalism is rife with historical errors; most are the
product of shoddy research.22 It is important to recognize that many
of the historical errors in originalist jurisprudence and scholarship are
not the inevitable result of an opaque and distant past. In
Rumsfeldian terms, these errors are not “known unknowns,” 23 but
instead simple questions about the past for which the answer is
known. Some of the historical errors are so egregious that the most
plausible explanation is intellectual dishonesty.

20. Id.
21. Lino A. Graglia, Originalism and the Constitution: Does Originalism Always Provide the
Answer?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 87 (2011).
22. For an excellent taxonomy of errors, see Powell, supra note 17.
23. Although the known known, known unknown, and unknown known is generally attributed to
Donald Rumsfeld, the typology dates to at least 1969. See, e.g., Harold B. Myers, For Lockheed
Everything’s Coming Up Unk-Unks, FORTUNE MAG., Aug. 1969, at 77.
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The original understanding of the Fourth Amendment is one of the
most contested issues in constitutional originalism. Lamentably,
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is marred by historical errors.
The Amendment has two clauses, known as the Reasonableness
Clause and the Warrant Clause. Two schools of thought have
developed purporting to interpret the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. The first one, the more textual one, suggests that the
first clause of the Amendment declares an existing right—the
freedom from unreasonable governmental invasions of privacy—
while the second clause interprets the first one, explaining that a
search with a warrant would not be “unreasonable” and thus
prohibited.24 In contrast, the second school of thought argues that the
Fourth Amendment only regulates the use of warrants. 25 Telford
Taylor argued that the Framers were not concerned with warrantless
and oppressive searches, largely because the powers of constables
were limited and because government officials did not enjoy
sovereign immunity from tort liability as they do now.26 Instead, the
Framers wanted to affirm that warrants were a valid exercise of
government power. 27 Relying on Madison’s writing, Taylor argues
that the great evil that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent
24. See e.g., WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING
(2009); JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1, 19, 43 (1966) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment was “the
one procedural safeguard in the Constitution that grew directly out of the events which immediately
preceded the revolutionary struggle with England”); NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 100–03 (1937).
Not every scholar falls into one of the two camps. See, e.g., George C. Thomas III, Time Travel,
Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451, 1478 (2005) (asserting that four principles emerge from the historical
record: 1) the Framers feared government abuse of power; 2) searches generally required
“individualized cause or suspicion”; 3) searches of structures always required a warrant; and 4) common
law principles influenced regulation of searches and seizures).
25. See Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved Common-Law
Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—”Fourth Amendment Reasonableness” Is
Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 51, 64–65 (2010).
26. See TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 27–28 (1969). If a
government official abused their position, their actions were considered ultra vires and more
importantly private rather than public abuses. Therefore, the government official was liable personally
for his wrongdoing. See Davies, supra note 25, at 75.
27. See TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 41–44.
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were general warrants.28 He notes a lack of legislative history about
the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment and speculates
that its purpose “was to cover shortcomings in warrants other than
those specified in the second clause” or “other unforeseeable
contingencies.” 29 According to Taylor, it was not the purpose of
Fourth Amendment to prohibit all searches without a warrant.30
Taylor’s book has been widely cited31 and inspired many academic
responses, two of which have particularly influenced the Supreme
Court’s modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: Akhil Amar’s and
Thomas Davies’s.
Professor Akhil Amar accepts Taylor’s premise that the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement had no fixed meaning at
the time of its adoption. 32 Professor Thomas Davies, in contrast,
accepts Taylor’s historical argument that the Fourth Amendment was
primarily concerned with civil warrants for government searches of
customs violations—smuggling. 33 There was no “reasonableness”
standard for government searches. Peace officers’ discretionary
authority was very limited (and they were subject to private trespass
suits), so discretionary searches were not a concern in the late
eighteenth century. 34 During the twentieth century, peace officers’
discretionary search and seizure authority expanded considerably,
well beyond anything the Framers might have imagined, and the

28. Id. at 42–43.
29. Id. at 43.
30. Id. at 46–47.
31. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 169 (2008); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S.
318, 336 (2001); Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989). Use of a reasonableness test
predates Taylor’s book. E.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61–63 (1950). But Taylor’s
scholarship provided justification for the test by developing a historical argument supporting
reasonableness. TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 27–29.
32. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 764–65 (1994).
Amar’s article has been cited in Moore, 553 U.S. at 170, and Atwater, 532 U.S. at 332 n.6. For some of
the scholarly response to Amar’s theory, see Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment
Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994).
33. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 678
(1999).
34. See id. at 552, 624–625.
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modern reasonableness doctrine is a judicial response to the new
threat to privacy that such expansion of authority created.35
Thus, when the Framers debated the Fourth Amendment they
considered language proscribing only general warrants, but
ultimately rejected it for the more universal language of the Fourth
Amendment.36 While some of the Framers like Madison were largely
concerned with general warrants, the apparent consensus was a
broader concern with government power and individual privacy.37
Although Madison provided a draft of what became the Fourth
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment is largely the work of John
Adams. 38 Adams had experience with warrantless searches for
smuggled contraband in Massachusetts and had written extensively
on the trials starting in the 1760s. The language of the Fourth
Amendment follows the language of Article 14 of the Massachusetts
Constitution that Adams drafted in 1779.39
Most of the historical errors related to the Fourth Amendment
revolve around the importance and timing of certain English cases
involving warrants.40 In particular, Entick’s Case has received outsize
attention, largely because its reasoning was adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States.41 Whatever the merits of
Entick’s Case, it is surely a historical error to believe the Fourth
Amendment was drafted in light of it. The Boyd Court asserts:
[E]very American statesman, during our revolutionary and
formative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this
monument of English freedom, and considered it as the true and
ultimate expression of constitutional law, it may be confidently
asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those who
35. See id. at 724–26.
36. Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86
IND. L.J. 979, 1060 (2011).
37. Id. at 1061.
38. Id. at 982.
39. Id. at 982, 1004–06, 1018–20.
40. Id. at 980–81.
41. 116 U.S. 616, 626–27 (1886).
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framed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and were
considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by
unreasonable searches and seizures.42

But, the opinion from Entick’s Case cited in Boyd was published in
the nineteenth century, decades after the drafting of the Fourth
Amendment, so “Justice Bradley’s historical claim is almost certainly
incorrect.” 43
Just like the broad reasonableness standard in the Fourth
Amendment, the exclusionary rule is based on a mistaken
understanding of history.44 At common law, no rule precluded the use
of improperly obtained evidence in a prosecution.45 The exclusionary
rule is a nineteenth century innovation, and a late one at that.46
The Confrontation Clause embodied in the Sixth Amendment has
likewise been fertile ground for misreading history. Crawford v.
Washington, 47 a 2004 Supreme Court opinion, has generated a
scholarship of historical errors. The case decided when hearsay
statements could be introduced in a criminal case under the
Confrontation Clause, specifically, the wife’s statement to the police
in a case against her husband. Because of Washington’s spousal
privilege, the wife did not testify at trial, so the prosecution used her
statement to the police instead. The majority held that the
Confrontation Clause guarantees the criminal defendant the right to
confront witnesses and the wife’s inability to testify violated that
principle: her statement to the police could not be used.48
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion rests on a couple of significant
historical errors. First, he concluded that the confrontation right was
42. Id.
43. Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The
Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 933,
955–56 (2010).
44. Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., A Critique of Two Arguments Against the Exclusionary Rule: The
Historical Error and the Comparative Myth, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 881, 885 (1975).
45. Id. at 885.
46. See id. at 887 (offering case law evidence that the rule did not exist until around 1875).
47. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
48. Id. at 40, 68.
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limited to testimonial statements that were comparable to framing-era
depositions of witnesses of crimes. Second, he concluded that out-ofcourt testimonies could be admissible only if the defendant had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.49 But he is wrong on both
counts, largely as a result of two elementary errors. His treatment of
history is spotty and obviously a search for a particular answer rather
than the correct one. 50 He cited to only two individuals from the
ratification debates, neither of whom appears to be a lawyer, both of
whom were reading long lists of complaints about the Constitution
based on “broader political theory,” not specific concerns about trial
practice. 51 Specific conclusions that Justice Scalia tries to justify
cannot be justified with the evidence he offers.52
In trying to divine the meaning of the Confrontation Clause,
Justice Scalia spends much of his opinion in Crawford discussing the
Marian bail and committal statutes dating to the sixteenth century.53
But the Marian statutes are largely irrelevant as historical evidence
for what the Confrontation Clause meant in 1791.54 First, there is no
evidence that the elites who drafted the Sixth Amendment objected to
Marian statutes, since those statutes were generally used to prosecute
the poor.55 Instead, there is ample evidence that elites, particularly
those most active during the War of Independence, were concerned
about the efforts taken by the English to prevent smuggling.56 A more

49. Thomas Y. Davies, What Did The Framers Know, And When Did They Know It? Fictional
Originalism in Crawford V. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 107 (2005) [hereinafter, Davies,
What, When].
50. See Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine?,
71 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 77–78 (2005).
51. Id. at 81–82.
52. See id. at 38, 77–78 (arguing that the evidence presented does not match the conclusions).
53. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43–44, 46, 50, 52–53. Since the statutes were passed while Mary was
Queen, the bail and committal statutes are called Marian. 1 & 2 Phil. & M., ch. 13 (1554) and 2 & 3
Phil. & M., ch. 10, 11 (1555). See generally John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at
Common Law, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 313 (1973) (describing the common law before and after the
Marian statutes).
54. See Davies, What, When, supra note 49, at 115–17.
55. Kirst, supra note 50, at 78.
56. Id.
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general problem for this line of inquiry is that there are no references
to English common law in the ratification debates.57
Professor Kirst argues the historical errors at issue in Crawford
reflect a general problem in presentist history. It can be misleading
for the scholar to look back and identify a historical progression. To
the people living in what is later identified as a historical progression,
it is impossible to know what will happen. Their perception of the
importance of historical antecedents will be substantially different
than to someone reading that history centuries later.58
II. OPEN FIELDS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
By its terms, the Fourth Amendment protects “persons, houses,
papers, and effects.” 59 Courts have extended the protections of the
Fourth Amendment from the home to the curtilage.60 Deriving from
Old French for court, yard, or garden, 61 the curtilage is the area
around the house, often enclosed, so intimately bound up with the
house that intruding upon the curtilage is tantamount to entering the
home. 62 Treating curtilage like the home has been a constant in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 63 The protections afforded the
curtilage, however, do not extend to the area beyond, usually referred
to as open fields, regardless of whether the land is “neither ‘open’ nor
a ‘field’ as those terms are used in common speech.”64

57. Id. at 82.
58. Id. at 84–85.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
60. S. Bryan Lawrence III, Curtilage or Open Fields?: Oliver v. United States Gives Renewed
Significance to the Concept of Curtilage in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 795, 796
(1985). Curtilage is traditionally the outbuildings and the land surrounding the home. Id.
61. Id. at 796 n.7.
62. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (establishing a four-factor test for
curtilage).
63. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 466 (1928).
64. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 n.11 (1984)).
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A. From Castle to Phone Booth
The first articulation of a limit on government authority to search
comes from Semayne’s Case where the case reporter, Sir Edward
Coke, described the home as a “castle and fortress.” 65 By 1765,
English courts had applied trespass law as a “ready benchmark” for
the proper balance between individual rights and government power,
and nineteenth century American courts followed their lead.66
In England, trespass was a robust remedy. Under the laws of
England, “every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is
a trespass.” 67 Entering property without permission constituted
trespass and was actionable, even if it caused no actual harm.68 The
choice of trespass as a “ready benchmark” of a Fourth Amendment
search could be a procedural quirk as much as a conscious decision
by the English bench. 69 In similar cases, aggrieved plaintiffs pled
other actions, but American jurisprudence has largely followed one
case, pleaded in trespass.
Entick v. Carrington70 is the 1765 decision that is quoted for the
proposition that a government search involving trespass requires a
warrant. Royal messengers broke into and searched the home of John
Entick, a writer suspected of producing “very seditious”
65. Seymayne’s Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.).
66. Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the ‘Reasonable Expectation of Privacy’: An Emerging Tripartite
Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1083 (1987). Although widely accepted, this narrative is somewhat
misleading since the plaintiff pleaded trespass in Entick’s Case; trespass was not a metaphor, but instead
the cause of action. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626 (discussing Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807
(C.P.), 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1030). Later cases, however, appear to treat the use of trespass as
a metaphor. See id. at 627–630 (using trespass law to define the expectation of privacy the Framers
intended to protect).
67. Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P.), 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1066. The
King’s messengers had an invalid warrant. Id. at 1037, 1074. Note that this case report was not
published until the early nineteenth century, so the Framers would have been aware of the trial and some
of the arguments made but would not have seen these quotations.
68. Id. at 1066. “By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is
a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my license, but he is liable to an action,
though the damage be nothing.” Id.
69. In Wilkes v. Wood, on facts virtually identical to those of Entick’s Case, Wilkes sued the King’s
messengers for false imprisonment. Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P.). See also Clancy,
supra note 36, at 1006–1007. Had the U.S. Supreme Court chosen to elevate Wilkes like Entick’s Case,
then Fourth Amendment jurisprudence might borrow from habeas corpus law instead of trespass.
70. 19 Howell’s St. Tr. 1029.
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newsletters. 71 Entick was arrested and detained, but ultimately
released. Although he was released, Entick feared subsequent trial, so
he sued the king’s messenger for trespass, hoping to avoid conviction
based on the content of the documents seized. 72 Trespass was the
appropriate tort action in the eighteenth century for unlawful entry,
since other modern torts were unavailable.
While the English authorities were concerned about sedition in
England, the colonial governments were more concerned with
smuggling. In America, authorities were searching for contraband,
not sedition.73 After independence, the government’s interest evolved
into the search for “moonshine whiskey” 74 and, more recently,
narcotics. 75 During colonial times, authorities issued warrants to
search and recover stolen goods, and to combat smuggling. Unlike
now, warrants issued for stolen goods were issued to the victim of the
theft. After receiving the warrant, he could go to the place specified
with a constable to search for the goods. The only governmentinitiated searches were those for smuggled goods.76
The meaning of the Fourth Amendment has puzzled courts and
academics. The U.S. Supreme Court has vacillated between the
competing views of the relationship between the Reasonableness and
Warrant Clauses. In particular the Court’s earlier opinions seem to
assume that a warrant complying with the Warrant Clause was
always necessary,77 though some of the more modern cases reaffirm
71. Id. at 1030.
72. Id.
73. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).
74. See, e.g., Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924).
75. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173 (1984).
76. See Clancy, supra note 36, at 990–92 (noting the disparity between warrant disputes in America
and England).
77. See Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932) (finding that failure to obtain a warrant before
searching a garage, when there was “abundant opportunity” to do so, necessitated suppression of
evidence); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925) (“While the question has never been
directly decided by this court, it has always been assumed that one’s house cannot lawfully be searched
without a search warrant.”); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 316–17 (1921) (finding that the
government could not search a house without a warrant); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393–94
(1914) (“The United States marshal could only have invaded the house of the accused when armed with
a warrant issued as required by the Constitution . . . .”); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878)
(asserting that a warrant based on probable cause was necessary to search a letter in the mail).
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the position that warrantless searches and seizures are per se
unreasonable, with a few well established exceptions. 78 On other
occasions, the Court has taken the opposite position, holding that
reasonableness of the government’s search depends on the totality of
the circumstances.79
After ratification, the Fourth Amendment produced little
commentary and even less litigation. The first U.S. Supreme Court
case to discuss the Fourth Amendment in any depth is Boyd v. United
States.80 In Boyd, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of
Entick’s Case.81 In 1884, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
of New York sought the forfeit of thirty-five cases of plate glass,
imported without the payment of customs duty. 82 Boyd quotes at
length from Entick’s Case, including language where trespass is
identified as the measure of governmental invasion.83
In 1924, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that open fields were not
protected by the Fourth Amendment—a case of first impression.84 In
Hester v. United States, revenue officers had approached the home of
a suspected moonshiner. Seeing the officers, Hester and another
moonshiner fled, discarding their bottles of untaxed spirits. 85 The

78. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S 332, 346–47 (2009) (allowing a search without a warrant
where the peace officers face an actual and continuing threat to their safety); California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 565, 580–81 (1991) (allowing police to search a vehicle, including the contents of sealed
containers); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 391, 393 (1978) (allowing a search without a warrant if
exigent circumstances exist); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 & n.19 (1967) (referencing the
exceptions recognized before 1967).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 42 (2003) (rejecting the lower court’s categorical
approach in favor of a totality of circumstances test as a measure of reasonableness); United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (holding that the “general” approach to measuring reasonableness
examines the totality of circumstances); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1950) (“The
relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was
reasonable. That criterion in turn depends upon the facts and circumstances—the total atmosphere of the
case.”), overruled in part by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
80. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
81. Id. at 626–29; see also Thomas K. Clancy, What is a “Search” Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 14 (2006); Wilkins, supra note 66, at 1083.
82. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617.
83. Id. at 627.
84. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924); see also Susan Gellman, Comment, Affirmation
of the Open Fields Doctrine: The Oliver Twist, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 729, 729, 730 (1985).
85. Hester, 265 U.S. at 58.
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Court found that the officers did not need a warrant to search open
fields. The Court held that the distinction between open fields and
“the house is as old as the common law.”86 Rather cryptically, the
opinion cites Blackstone’s discussion of burglary, possibly because
the English law of trespass differed from American law.87
In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Hester is often seen as an
anomaly, an exception to the rule of trespass. The opinion itself
provides little guidance on whether open fields are an exception to
the general rule that any incursion of private land was a trespass or an
application of the settled law that access to unenclosed land was not a
trespass. The historical research presented in the following sections
shows that Hester is not an exception. Rather, trespass law did not
extend to open fields, and therefore the Fourth Amendment
protections could not and do not extend to open fields.
As further evidence that open fields are not an exception to
trespass, but instead an application of the doctrine, Hester did not
mark a retreat from trespass analysis. Four years later, the Court
found that wiretapping did not require a search warrant since there
was no trespass of the defendant’s property.88 Similarly, electronic
monitoring of a conversation within the home was not protected so
long as the government did not commit a trespass. 89 However,
touching the home required a warrant because it constituted a
trespass. 90 In Silverman v. United States, the Court distinguished
between eavesdropping that required a physical invasion and that
which did not.91

86. Id. at 59.
87. Id. (citing “4 Bl.Comm. 223, 225, 226”).
88. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751 (1952) (finding no trespass where government agents
wore a wire); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
89. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 131, 134 (1942) (finding no trespass where government
amplified the vibrations emanating through a wall), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
90. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S 505, 506–507, 512 (1961) (finding a trespass and therefore
a search where government attached a device to the home).
91. Id. at 511.
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In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court in Katz v. United States
abandoned its trespass analysis, finding a search when no property
interest had been violated. Katz had used a public telephone booth to
transmit an illegal wager which was recorded by a device that FBI
agents attached to the outside of the booth. The Court nonetheless
noted that Katz’s privacy “expectation [was one] that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”92 The Court found that the
lack of a trespass had no constitutional relevance to whether a search
had occurred. Instead, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”93
Without the clear framework of “technical trespass under local
property law,” 94 the Court has looked for guidance in a variety of
places. In United States v. Chadwick, the Court considered the
probable intention of the Framers.95 In Payton v. New York, the Court
reaffirmed the understanding that the home enjoys special
protection.96
While Katz clearly overruled earlier eavesdropping cases, its effect
on Hester and the open fields doctrine is less clear. Gellman suggests
that Katz did not overturn Hester because the “facts of Hester simply
did not meet the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test.” 97
Counsel for both parties in Katz argued that open fields were the
paradigmatic example of areas lacking constitutional protection, but
the Court rejected that reasoning, holding that the “the correct
solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted
by incantation of the phrase ‘constitutionally protected area.’”98

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
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Katz, 389 U.S. at 348, 353, 361.
Id. at 351–53 (citations omitted).
Id. at 353 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
433 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1977).
445 U.S. 573, 596–97 & n.45 (1980).
Gellman, supra note 84, at 734.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 350, 351 n.8; see also Lawrence, supra note 60, at 803.
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In 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed Hester, holding that a
search warrant was not required for entering open fields. 99 In Air
Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa, a state health inspector
entered the company’s open fields to measure air pollution. The
Court noted that the “field inspector did not enter the plant or offices.
He was not inspecting stacks, boilers, scrubbers, flues, grates, or
furnaces; nor was his inspection related to respondent’s files or
papers.”100 The Court did not consider whether entering land without
landowner permission was a trespass under Colorado law.101
Ten years later, the Court affirmed Hester in a longer and moredetailed opinion. In Oliver v. United States, the Court clarified that
“no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open fields” and
furthermore that open fields are not “‘effects’ within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.” 102 Oliver was suspected of cultivating
cannabis. Ignoring a locked gate and “No Trespassing” signs,
narcotics agents searched Oliver’s land and found cannabis
cultivation. The Court noted that “[t]he existence of a property right
is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are
legitimate.”103
Whether a particular government action was a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore required a warrant,
revolved around social expectations, not property law. The Court
held that “fields do not provide the setting for those intimate
activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government
interference or surveillance.”104 The Court concluded by holding that
“[t]here is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those
activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open
fields.”105 After Oliver, a trespass makes a search unreasonable, but
not every unreasonable search means that the government trespassed.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. W. Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974).
Id. at 862–63, 864–65.
The word trespass does not appear in the opinion. Id.
466 U.S. 170, 176, 180 (1984).
Id. at 173, 182, 183.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 179.
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In the absence of trespass, an invasion of a reasonable expectation of
privacy makes a search unreasonable.106
B. Like a Bad Penny
Jones was widely seen as a milestone in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence because it has the potential to be the most important
case since Katz.107 The potential impact of Jones is uncertain, largely
because the three opinions—the majority opinion and two
concurrences—take such different approaches. 108 Commentators
have reacted with both praise and scorn.109 Many agree that Jones
raises at least as many questions as it answers; again, this reaction is
hardly surprising given the tripartite outcome.110
Before Jones, there were concerns whether the reasonable
expectation of privacy test articulated in Katz could protect the
privacy of citizens in an era of rapidly advancing technology.111 One
of the few conclusions one can draw from the three opinions is that
nine justices agree that citizens’ privacy should not shrink in the face
of technology. 112 Five of the justices interpreted the reasonable
expectation of privacy as reasonable in light of social expectations
rather than technological possibility. Specifically, five justices held
that long-term GPS monitoring conflicted with a reasonable
expectation that the public was not under continuous observation and
monitoring.113
106. The Court did not consider whether Oliver had posted his land consistent with Kentucky’s
posting statute, which would give him a trespass remedy for unwanted invasions. In 1984, Kentucky law
made crossing a fence to enter private land a trespass, but allowed entering private land not surrounded
by a fence. Act of Mar. 30, 1976, 1976 Ky. Acts 500, 500–501. Today, Kentucky trespass law makes no
distinction between fenced and unfenced law. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150.092 (1996).
107. Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS Tracking out of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United States v. Jones
and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012).
108. Id. at 17.
109. Daniel T. Pesciotta, Note, I’m Not Dead Yet: Katz, Jones, and the Fourth Amendment in the 21st
Century, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 230–32 (2012).
110. Lauren Millcarek, Comment, Eighteenth Century Law, Twenty-First Century Problems: Jones,
GPS Tracking, and the Future of Privacy, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1101, 1108–09 & n.79 (2012).
111. Pesciotta, supra note 109, at 189.
112. Id. at 190.
113. Id. at 213.
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Until Katz, trespass was the yardstick of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Trespass delineated the boundaries of search and thus,
when the government needed a warrant. Jones appears to have
revived trespass as the measure of search, but not current trespass
law. Instead, Jones looks to trespass law in 1791, but describes that
law incorrectly. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia writes that
any unauthorized entry in private land constituted a trespass at
common law. 114 He describes English trespass law—barring any
entry on private property—as a “monument of English freedom” that
was “undoubtedly familiar” to the Framers at the time they were
drafting the constitution. 115 Justice Alito’s concurrence agrees. He
refers to Prosser and Keeton’s treatise, saying that “[a]t common law,
any unauthorized intrusion on private property was actionable.”116
The remainder of this Article shows that both the majority and the
concurrence correctly describe the law of England. They are wrong
about the law in colonial America. The next Part describes trespass
law in colonial America and the early Republic. The open fields
doctrine is consistent with both Katz and Jones since trespass law in
1791 did not grant the landowner the power to exclude unwanted
visitors from open land.
III. TRESPASS IN 1791
Both opinions in Jones equate American trespass law in 1791 with
English trespass law. This Part describes the distinctly American
property law tradition that developed soon after first settlement and
continued until long after ratification of the Fourth Amendment. In
Part III.A, a review of eighteenth century case law shows that the
doctrines identified in Jones were not present in American law. Part
III.B describes the state constitutional provisions that enshrined a
trespass law very different from that of England. Finally, Part III.C

114. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949, 953 (2012).
115. Id. at 949 (quoting Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989)).
116. Id. at 958.
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details a variety of colonial and early Republic statutes that shed light
on the content of trespass in American common law.
A. Trespass in the Eighteenth Century Case Law
At common law, trespass was used to mean several different
wrongs unrelated to land. These now-archaic uses of trespass
dominate the eighteenth century case law. The word “trespass”
appears in 409 reported cases between 1701 and 1800.
1. A Pleading for All Seasons
During the eighteenth century, trespass actions were most
frequently filed to resolve competing claims of ownership. Of these,
trespass quare clausum fregit was the most common, available to one
in lawful possession of the land against unlawful incursions. 117
Unlike a suit to resolve title, which was often protracted and messy
because of poorly maintained records, a possessory trespass suit was
a quicker and simpler way to resolve the dispute.118
Trespass was not merely a suit to determine ownership. An action
of trespass was often used for wrongs that now would be litigated as
torts. Violent wrongs were pled as trespass vi et armis, while other
wrongs were pled as trespass on the case.119 Occasionally, trespass
was pleaded in cases of sexual misconduct.120 Other cases appear to
use trespass as a non-specific synonym for wrong, similar to its use
centuries earlier.121
117. E.g., Bishop v. Bishop, 1 Del. Cas. 386 (1795) (dispute between heirs). Colonial statutes often
regulated or amended the common law action of quare clausum fregit. Act of Mar. 27, 1713, ch. 196,
1713 Pa. Laws 89, 91 (allowing defendants to disclaim a property claim where the trespass was
involuntary).
118. Responding to the difficulty, states often enacted statutes that regulated trespass suits to try title.
See, e.g., Act of Dec. 20, 1791, 1791 S.C. Acts 9, 13 (“trespass brought to try the title to land”); Act of
Dec. 21, 1799, 1799 S.C. Acts 49, 55 (“trespass to try titles to lands”).
119. Trespass vi et armis and on the case are distinguished in a dispute over a servant who switched
employers. Legaux v. Feasor, 1 Yeates 586, 587 (Pa. 1795).
120. E.g., Stout v. Prall, 1 N.J.L. 79, 79, 80 (1791) (finding exemplary damages appropriate for
“seduction and getting with child”).
121. E.g., State v. Ingles, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 4 (Super. Ct. 1797) (“The State cannot divide an offense,
consisting of several trespasses into as many indictments as there are acts of trespass”); Town of Somers
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In three eighteenth century trespass cases, someone entered land
without claiming ownership and removed something of value. In
Massachusetts, the defendants had removed clams without landowner
permission. 122 In Connecticut, one defendant logged without
permission, while another removed honey. 123 In these cases, the
owner pleaded trespass when the real offense was theft. Clams,
timber, and honey were all valuable property, all removed without
right by the defendants. The dearth of cases does not reflect the paltry
damages. Parties were willing to litigate even the smallest trifles.124
In no reported eighteenth century case did a landowner sue an
unauthorized intruder merely for intruding—the modern meaning of
trespass. The paucity of cases does not conform to the conventional
wisdom that the colonies inherited the common law from England.
Blackstone notes that damages need not be proved to recover for
“EVERY unwarrantable entry on another’s soil.”125 But Blackstone’s
doctrine was not accepted in the American colonies. The absence of
trespass cases for mere entry reflects a distinctly American property
law tradition.126
2. New Laws for a New Land
The colonists who settled America left a crowded island with
clearly demarcated boundaries and intensive land use. In contrast to
v. Town of Barkhamstead, 1 Root 398 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1792) (stating a foreign pauper “belongs to the
state to provide for; Barkhamstead’s sending him to Somers was a trespass, for which this action lies”).
122. Proprietors of Common and Undivided Lands in Ipswich v. Herrick, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) 529,
532–33 (1772).
123. Merrils v. Goodwin, 1 Root 209, 209 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1790) (removing honey without
permission); Phelps v. Sanford, 1 Kirby 343, 343 (Conn. Super. Ct.1787) (logging without permission).
124. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 177 (N.Y. 1805) (appellate litigation over a fox pelt).
125. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *209 (capitalization in original).
126. Despite the popularity of citing to Blackstone’s treaty, trespass is not the only English common
law doctrine that was only partly received in America. In England, all game was owned and there
existed qualification statutes. Hunting Act, 1389, 13 Rich. 2, c. 13 (Eng.). In 1831, the qualification
system was replaced by licensing and landowner permission for hunting. Game Act, 1831, 1& 2 Will. 4,
c. 32, §§ 1, 6 (Eng.).
In America, however, wild game was “no persons Property till taken in Hunting.” 1744 Conn.
Pub. Acts 538. In fact, the presumption in favor of capture was so strong that “many persons suppose
they may take them wheresoever they may be found as well in Parks as in the open Woods.” Id.
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England’s plentiful labor and scarce land, America was uncultivated
and underpopulated. Within a few years of settlement, every colony
rejected the English law of trespass and enacted new laws for a new
continent. 127 Until landowners fenced their land, the public could
travel, hunt, fish, and forage on private land without permission.128 In
addition, stock owners could let their cattle or hogs graze on private
land without having to seek permission. 129 Every state enacted
statutes allowing open access to unfenced land.130 Decades, and in
some cases centuries, later, states abandoned the American rule and
introduced the English law of trespass.131
In the United States, enclosed (seen also as inclosed) means
fenced. In England, land where ancient rights have been extinguished
by enclosure is a close, whether fenced or not. Thus, under English
common law, “EVERY unwarrantable entry on another’s soil the law
entitles a trespass by breaking his close.” 132 In contrast, American
jurists used the term in a more literal sense: enclosed meant fenced,
and only incursions on fenced land were considered trespass.133
Early nineteenth century cases can shed light on what rights the
landowner had over open land. We can thank John Singleton, a
particularly litigious landowner from South Carolina, for two high
court opinions that show the limited rights that landowners had to
exclude from open land.
In 1818, South Carolina’s highest court noted that “the right to
hunt on unenclosed and uncultivated lands has never been
disputed.” 134 The opinion continued: “it is well known that it has

127. E.g., Act 52, 1 HENING’S STAT. AT LARGE 199 (1632) (replacing the English law of trespass in
Virginia).
128. See, e.g., Nashville & Chattanooga R.R. Co. v. Peacock, 25 Ala. 229, 232 (1854) (holding that
the common law regarding trespasses by animals had never been adopted in Alabama).
129. Brian Sawers, The Right to Exclude from Unimproved Land, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 665, 676–77
(2011) [hereinafter Sawers, Right to Exclude].
130. Id. at 675.
131. Id. at 679–80.
132. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 125, at *209, *209–10. (capitalization in original).
133. In the late nineteenth century, courts in the United States begin to use close in the English sense,
as courts import more of the English common law, replacing indigenous traditions.
134. M’Conico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244, 246 (1818).
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been universally exercised from the first settlement of the country up
to the present time.”135 Even though the landowner was present and
refused the hunter permission, there was no trespass. Landowner
permission was irrelevant because, as the court held, “it is the right of
the inhabitants to hunt on unenclosed lands,” and that right could not
be defeated by “mere will and caprice of an individual.”136
Two years later, Singleton returned to the South Carolina courts
when a group of hunters entered a fallow field enclosed by a
dilapidated fence. Again, Singleton lost since landowners were
required to maintain their fences to preserve their right to exclude
unwanted visitors. Like in the earlier case, landowner permission was
irrelevant since the hunters had a right to be there. More explicitly
than in 1818, the South Carolina court noted that England was thickly
settled, which was not true of South Carolina. The English rule was
“wholly impracticable” and “destructive of the interests and peace of
the community.”137
Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court explicitly rejected the
English rule that owners could exclude from open land, noting that
the rule would “require a revolution in our people’s habits of thought
and action.”138 The Georgia Supreme Court continued: the English
rule would mean that a “man could not walk across his neighbor’s
unenclosed land . . . without subjecting himself to damages for a
trespass. Our whole people, with their present habits, would be
converted into a set of trespassers. We do not think that such is the
Law.”139
The landowner’s right to exclude from open land was so limited
that some courts analogized open, but privately owned land to a
common. In South Carolina, “[u]ninclosed land, for many purposes,

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Broughton v. Singleton, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 338, 338–40 (1820) (“There, almost every
foot of soil is appropriated to some specific purpose; here, much the greater part consists in uninclosed
and uncultivated forest”). Id.
138. Macon & W. R.R. Co. v. Lester, 30 Ga. 911, 914 (1860).
139. Id.
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such as hunting and pasture, is regarded as common.”140 The court
was quick to note the limits of the analogy, since a landowner could
“appropriate it to his exclusive use” by fencing it.141
Almost a century later, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it was
“customary to wander, shoot and fish” over “large expanses of
unenclosed and uncultivated land.”142 In addition, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the open range governed the public lands. In 1890,
the U.S. Supreme Court found no trespass for cattle grazing on
private land if “open and unenclosed.”143 Landowners overrun with
their neighbor’s livestock challenged the constitutionality of these
statutes, but none succeeded,144 which is hardly surprising given how
widespread these laws were.
B. State Constitutional Provisions
When the Fourth Amendment was drafted, two state constitutions
explicitly guaranteed a public right to hunt on open land. Necessarily,
landowners had no right to exclude from unfenced land and thus
unwanted intrusions were not actionable.
In 1777, Vermont adopted its first constitution which guaranteed
its citizens the “liberty to hunt and fowl, in seasonable times, on the
lands they hold, and on other lands (not enclosed).”145 Additionally,
inhabitants had the liberty “in like manner, to fish in all boatable and
other waters, not private property.” 146 Vermont adopted new
constitutions in 1786 and 1793 which preserved the provision. 147
Since enclosed meant fenced in America, the liberty to hunt extended
to unfenced land, regardless of ownership or permission. In 1902, the
140. Law v. Nettles, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 447, 447 (S.C. Ct. App. 1831).
141. Id.
142. McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922).
143. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890).
144. E.g., Wills v. Waters, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 351, 352. (1869) (“[W]e entertain no doubt of the
constitutionality of the statutes”).
145. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § 39.
146. Id.
147. Compare VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § 39, with VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. 2, § 37, and VT. CONST.
of 1793, ch. 2, § 40. The current constitution preserves the provision. VT. CONST. ch 2, § 67.
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Vermont Supreme Court held that hunting on unfenced land was not
a trespass on account of this provision.148
Most historical sources treat fenced and enclosed as synonyms
without elaboration, but the Vermont Supreme Court provided a
more detailed definition. Interpreting a 1797 statute, the Supreme
Court of Vermont held that the “word enclosure therefore imports,
land enclosed with something more than the imaginary boundary
line, that there should be some visible or tangible obstruction, such as
a fence, hedge, ditch or something equivalent.”149
Vermont’s constitutional guarantee mimics an earlier
constitutional provision from Pennsylvania. In 1776, Pennsylvania
adopted a new constitution, which guaranteed: “The inhabitants of
this state shall have liberty to fowl and hunt in seasonable times on
the lands they hold, and on all other lands therein not inclosed; and in
like manner to fish in all boatable waters, and others not private
property.” 150 Pennsylvania first guaranteed the liberty to hunt and
fish in 1683.151 The 1683 provision guaranteed a broader right to fish,
including the “liberty to draw his or their Fish on shore on any mans
Lands” providing the water was boatable. 152 After the Fourth
Amendment was drafted, but before ratification, Pennsylvania
adopted a new constitution without an express provision but
continued to endorse a right of access to public and privately owned
bodies of water for fishing.153
At the Constitutional Convention, members of Pennsylvania’s
delegation proposed a parallel provision along with the Bill of
Rights. When their proposal was not adopted, the dissenters
148. Payne v. Gould, 52 A. 421, 421, 422 (Vt. 1902).
149. Porter v. Aldrich, 39 Vt. 326, 331 (1866) (interpreting 1797 fence law, which allowed for the
impounding of cattle damage feasant in the landowner’s enclosure) (emphasis in original).
150. PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. 2, § 43.
151. PA. FRAME OF GOV’T of 1683, § 22. The third Frame preserved the provision. PA. FRAME OF
GOV’T of 1696. The first and fourth Frame (also called the Charter of Privileges) did not include the
provision. PA. FRAME OF GOV’T of 1682; PA. CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES of 1701.
152. PA. FRAME OF GOV’T of 1683, § 22 (adding “not to the detriment or annoyance of the Owner
thereof, except such Lands as do lie upon Inland Rivulets that are not Boatable, or which are or may be
hereafter erected into Mannors”)
153. PA. CONST. of 1790.
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published a tract explaining their objections to the draft
constitution.154
C. Related Colonial and Early Republic Statutes
Only two states, Pennsylvania and Vermont, constitutionalized a
public right to use open land. In the other states, unfettered public
access to open land was the norm, even if it did not receive
constitutional protection. 155 In the eighteenth century, legislatures
shaped the boundaries of private property law in law. In particular,
statutes defined trespasses and acknowledged the right to hunt and
fish on private land.
1. Trespass Statutes
Every statute is drafted in the shadow of existing law, whether
common or statutory. Contemporary statutes are evidence of what
trespass meant in 1791. In three states, the legislature expanded
common law trespass to protect the property rights of landowners.
The legislatures both extended the protections of the common law
and softened the procedural protections that defendants otherwise
enjoyed. After these statutes, landowners had broader rights over
their property—rights that were also easier to vindicate. The
significance of these statutes is that the statutes show the very limited
protections afforded to landowners by common law trespass. Unlike
that of England, trespass in eighteenth century American law was a
limited protection that applied only to improved land and chattels.
Like in the case law, eighteenth century legislatures used the word
trespass to mean several different wrongs, none of which included a
mere unwanted entry onto private land. Trespass as defined by statute
covers wrongs that today would be classified or protected by other
doctrines of tort law and, to some extent, criminal law.

154. ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION, OF THE STATE OF
PENNSYLVANIA, TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (1787).
155. Sawers, Right to Exclude, supra note 129, at 674–76.
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The earliest colonial statute expanding trespass allows neighboring
property owners to recover in trespass when fires escape from one
property and destroy buildings or other valuable improvements on
another property.156 At common law, a plaintiff may not have been
able to recover because the defendant did not touch the plaintiff’s
property. While the plaintiff could have pleaded trespass on the case
(often just called case), the legislature decided that remedy was
ineffective. Negligence as a doctrine did not develop until the
nineteenth century, so plaintiffs had no remedy based on defendants’
failure to exercise due care.157
After independence, Connecticut modified the common law of
trespass to allow recovery for another type of wrong which today
would not be considered a trespass. In 1789, the Connecticut
legislature modified the common law rule that owners were only
liable if a dog’s vicious nature was known, often called the “one bite
rule.” Allowing each dog to attack at least once before any recovery
made sheep rearing more difficult. In response to the threat of dogs
killing sheep, the Connecticut legislature enacted a trespass statute to
allow sheep owners to recover. The owners of sheep injured by dogs
could recover “by action, of trespass.”158
Three states enacted trespass statutes analogous to what wrongs
and remedies are considered trespass in current property law. One of
the statutes addressed illegal settlement; squatting on open land was a
persistent problem during the western expansion of the United States.
The remaining statutes cover a variety of wrongs, most of which are
some form of theft. None of the trespass statutes penalize or
proscribe merely entering land without permission. All require some
further act, whether settlement, the removal of some valuable
resource, or destroying or damaging some improvement on the land.

156. 1731 Conn. Pub. Acts 407, 408.
157. More than a century later, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court articulated a theory of torts
that did not rely on the plaintiff’s choice between trespass and case. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6
Cush.) 292, 296 (1850).
158. 1789 Conn. Pub. Acts 388, 388 (altering the law for those affected by “dogs . . . accustomed to
do such mischief” as attacking sheep).
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Like other states, New Hampshire struggled to control the frontier
with many farmers settling on land they did not own. In 1778, New
Hampshire responded to “sundry evil minded persons” who had
settled on unclaimed land with an “ACT to prevent trespasses on the
waste lands within this State.” 159 The trespasses prevented were
settlement: no person could “enter into, or take possession of any of
the waste lands.” 160 The contemporary usage of waste to describe
lands included both land that could not be used and land that had not
been put to use.161 The statute did not mean to protect usable land
but, instead, to prevent settlement on undeveloped land. The
disjunctive phrase “enter into, or take possession” indicates that enter
is used in its technical sense in property, not in the ordinary sense
often used in common language and occasionally other bodies of law.
As a term of art in property law, enter means to take possession, i.e.
to be seised of the property. Thus, trespass did not include crossing
private land under the statute.
Early in the eighteenth century, Connecticut enacted a trespass
statute to protect landowners from invasions of their property
rights. 162 The existing common law provided insufficient remedies
for landowners who suffered at the hands of a variety of interlopers
who removed valuable natural resources or damaged valuable
improvements. In addition to broadening the protection for property,
the statute also provided for special procedures to ease recovery.
Dissatisfied that trespassers were rarely punished, Connecticut
enacted a statute for the “more Effectual Detecting and Punishing
Trespass.”163 Under the statute, trespass included logging another’s
land without permission and damaging fences.164 Noting that trespass
was “very hard and difficult to Detect or Convict,” the statute
allowed recovery in cases where the evidence was weak.165
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
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Id. at 262.
Id. (defining waste as any “unappropriated” or “forfeited” lands).
1723–1730 Conn. Pub. Acts 329, 329.
Id.
Id. at 329–30.
Id. at 330 (allowing uncontroverted oaths to serve as proof).
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In 1791, New Hampshire passed a similar statute which borrowed
some of the language from Connecticut’s earlier statute. 166 In
addition, New Hampshire’s statute proscribed altering the marks on
logs in a river and penalized mining without landowner
permission.167 Someone who changed the markings would be able to
sell timber logged and owned by someone else.
In the decade that followed, New Hampshire enacted two more
trespass statutes to regulate the harvest and removal of valuable
natural resources. One resource was flattsweed, which grew in salt
marshes along New Hamsphire’s coast. In 1794, New Hampshire
made the removal of flattsweed from a salt marsh without the
landowner’s permission a trespass. 168 The other resource was
seaweed, which many farmers used for fertilizer. If the seaweed was
left somewhere between the ocean and the farm, however, its rotting
was a nuisance worthy of state intervention. In 1800, the New
Hampshire legislature enacted a statute making it a trespass to leave
rotting seaweed near the seashore.169
In 1787, Vermont enacted a similar statute, making logging
without permission a trespass. 170 Like many trespass statutes,
Vermont specified penalties greater than damages at common law.
For trees less than one foot in diameter, the penalty was five
shillings; for one foot trees the penalty was ten shillings; and fifteen
shillings for all trees larger than one foot. 171 Like in other states,
Vermont made it a trespass to “throw down, or leave open, any bars,
gates, fence or fences.”172 Also, the statute allowed those harmed by

166. Act of Feb. 15, 1791, 1792 N.H. Laws 259, 259. The preamble is almost identical to the
Connecticut statute. Compare id., with 1726 Conn. Pub. Acts 329, 330.
167. Act of Feb. 15, 1791, 1792 N.H. Laws 259, 259–60.
168. Act of Jan. 15, 1794, 1793 N.H. Laws 461 (trespass to remove “Flattsweed” from salt marshes).
169. Act of June 14, 1800, 1800 N.H. Laws 564 (trespass to leave rotting seaweed near shoreline).
170. Act of Mar. 3, 1787, 1787 Vt. Acts & Resolves 160, 160.
171. Id. If the court found trespass was by mistake and that the defendant “really believed” he was
logging on his own land or land he had permission to log, then the penalty was merely the value of the
timber removed. Id. at 161. If the timber was used for repairing roads or bridges, penalty was the “just
value” of the timber. Id.
172. Id. The statute imposed double the damages as penalty. Id. The statute set a higher penalty for
wearing disguises and beating people while damaging fences. Id.
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fires to recover in trespass.173 Finally, the statute allowed landowners
to sue for trespass those who removed grass, grain, or fruit.174
In 1780, Pennsylvania enacted a law to protect absent landowners
from unlawful logging.175 The statute’s preamble described logging
land without permission as “great trespasses and waste thereon, by
felling of timber.”176
In 1806, New York enacted a statute entitled “An ACT to prevent
Trespasses on Land.” 177 Like other states that enacted a trespass
remedy for logging another’s land without permission, New York
imposed treble damages.178 If the court, however, was satisfied that it
was a “mistake,” then the plaintiff landowner could only recover the
value of the logs removed plus costs.179 Where the lumber had been
used for making or repairing public roads or bridges, the landowner
was limited to the “just value” of the timber logged.180
In 1721, South Carolina adopted an English statute from 1545 that
allowed treble damages in trespass for specified wrongs. 181 The
proscribed acts included burning another’s cart, firewood,
construction materials, or cutting cattle tongues or human ears, or
barking fruit trees.182
Several states allowed turnpikes to plead trespass against those
who damaged the turnpike gate when trying to avoid paying the poll.
In 1796, Vermont made it a trespass to “cut, break down, or destroy
such turnpike gate” or to “forcibly pass, or attempt by force to pass”

173. Id. Plaintiffs could not recover for fire damage arising from “inevitable accident.” Id.
174. Id.
175. Act of Mar. 16, 1780, § 1, 1780 Pa. Laws 331, 331.
176. Id.
177. Act of Apr. 9, 1805, 1804 N.Y. Laws 247, 247. Generally, post-enactment evidence is
considered weaker. This author used “trefpafs” as the dividing line between contemporary and ex post.
In the eighteenth century, every other s was medial, i.e., rendered as a long s. Thrifty colonial printers
substituted the f type rather than the proper type ʃ. The Constitution and Bill of Rights were written and
printed with the medial s, while the Acts of Congress were printed entirely with the modern s starting in
1804.
178. Id. at 248.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 1721 S.C. Acts 57.
182. Id.
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without paying.183 The turnpike could only recover in trespass if the
defendant had damaged the turnpike gate. If the traveler avoided
payment without damaging the gate, by passing on the side of the
road, then the turnpike company could recover three times the toll by
pleading “debt on the case.”184
Similarly, New York’s legislature enacted a statute making it a
trespass to avoid paying the toll on a turnpike. 185 New York
penalized those who damaged bridges also; there, the recovery in
trespass was treble damages.186
Perhaps the most important trespass statute from the eighteenth
century comes from Rhode Island. Noting that trespass did not deter
“evil-minded Persons” who had “wilfully wickedly and wantonly”
stolen melons, the legislature declared melon stealing to be
larceny. 187 The significance is not that Rhode Islanders were
tormented by melon stealers, but that trespass was not a sufficient
remedy. The Rhode Island legislature enacted the melon protection
act because trespass was insufficient to protect the landowner’s
investment-backed expectations in their melons. The inescapable
conclusion is that trespass in colonial America is very different than
trespass in England. Trespass is not the imagined robust remedy of
Blackstone that many American legal scholars have embraced but
instead a very limited protection for exclusive property rights.
A colonial statute from South Carolina provides further evidence
that trespass was not the imagined robust remedy of Blackstone.
Instead, trespass merely enabled landowners to recover any damage
done to land. In 1722, the South Carolina legislature organized its
courts and granted to courts the power to appoint special masters to

183. Act of Nov. 3, 1796, § 4, 1796 Vt. Acts & Resolves 58, 62.
184. Id. “Debt on the case” may be a scrivener’s error since the actions were either debt or trespass on
the case, sometimes shortened to “on the case” or “case.” Later turnpike statutes allow recovery under
trespass on the case. Act of Feb. 6, 1804, § 7, 1804 Vt. Acts & Resolves 82; Act of Oct. 28, 1799, § 6,
1799 Vt. Acts & Resolves 52, 55.
185. Act of Feb. 22, 1803, § 13, 1803 N.Y. Laws 257, 261.
186. Act of Apr. 9, 1804, § 12, 1804 N.Y. Laws 515, 518.
187. 1783 R.I. Acts & Resolves 32, 32–33 (June adjourned session).
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investigate and report back to the courts. 188 The enabling clause
indicates that South Carolina’s legislature did not understand trespass
to be an offense against the sensibilities of the landowner but,
instead, one where the interloper had damaged the property of the
plaintiff. The statute authorized courts to appoint “sufficient persons
to view the said trespass or waste.”189 If the defendant had entered
private land without causing damage, there would be nothing for the
special master to view. Note that several Pennsylvania statutes from
the 1780s use the same binomial.190
Like in the colonial case law, colonial statutes often used trespass
as a catch-all term for tortuous wrongdoing. Perhaps the most
interesting example comes from the 1740 South Carolina slave code,
which creates a trespass action to allow persons held in bondage to
contest their enslavement.191 Any “negro, Indian, mulato or mestizo”
could allege their freedom in an “action of trespass, in the nature of
ravishment of ward.”192 Similarly, Virginia enacted a statute allowing
actions for trespass in the form of ravishment in cases of
kidnapping.193
More often, statutes did not create a new trespass action, but
instead modified the existing body of trespass law. In South Carolina,
the legislature enacted a special defense in actions of trespass,
allowing the defendant to argue that the plaintiff had forfeited the
property upon conviction. 194 After independence, South Carolina
modified its laws governing the attachment of property: trespass was
one of several actions where attachment was authorized.195 After the
188. Act of Feb. 13, 1722, § 2, 1722 S.C. Acts 119, 119–120.
189. Id.
190. Compare Act of Apr. 5, 1782, § 3, 1781–1782 Pa. Laws 21, 22 (“waste or trespass”), and Act of
Mar. 16, 1780, § 3, 1780 Pa. Laws 331, 332 (“trespass and waste”), with Act of Feb. 13, 1722, § 2, 1722
S.C. Acts 119, 120.
191. Act of May 20, 1740, § 1, 1731–1743 S.C. Acts 163, 164. In contrast, New York’s slave code
used trespass in the more conventional sense of tortious wrongdoing. Act of Oct. 29, 1730, § 11, 1730
N.Y. Laws 157, 160 (“Theft or other Trespass”).
192. Act of May 20, 1740, § 1, 1740 S.C. Acts 163, 164. Plaintiffs held the burden of proof, except
for “Indians in amity.” Id.
193. Act of Oct. 31, 1751, § 1, 1751 Va. Acts 156, 156.
194. Act of May 29, 1744, § 1, 1744 S.C. Acts 197, 198.
195. Act of Mar. 12, 1783, § 2, 1783 S.C. Acts 19, 20.
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Revolutionary War, South Carolina indemnified General Sumter and
his troops for any damage, directing injured parties to approach the
legislature. 196 In another trespass statute related to the War of
Independence, Vermont addressed property disputes involving
“traitor[s]” whose land had been confiscated.197 The Vermont statute
allowed defendants to “plead the general issue” as a defense in suits
of trespass.198
Less than a decade after the ratification of the Fourth Amendment,
Tennessee enacted a statute to protect owners’ interests in their
chattels.199 The owners of livestock could bring an action of trespass
against one who disfigured, injured, or killed livestock. 200 Also,
anyone who dug up, cut down, or destroyed fruit trees or corn was
liable in trespass.201
These statutes indicate two things about trespass law relevant to
understanding what trespass law was in 1791. Firstly, existing
trespass law did not sufficiently protect landowners from logging,
fence damage, or even mining. Thus, legislatures in several states
enacted laws to enhance the protections of the common law trespass
cause of action. Secondly, entering private property without
damaging the land was not penalized. None of the colonial or early
Republic statutes proscribed entering private land without
permission. None of these statutes challenged or modified the
distinctively American common law rules that entering open land
without permission was not a trespass. Instead, the statutes penalized
impositions on the landowner’s rights much greater and more severe
than merely crossing private land.

196. Act of Mar. 21, 1784, 1784 S.C. Acts 29, 29.
197. Act of Oct. 24, 1788, 1788 Vt. Acts & Resolves 26, 26.
198. Id. The statute addressed four suits used to decide ownership disputes: trespass, quare clausum
fregit, ejectment, and “other possessory action[s].” Id.
199. Act of Nov. 3, 1803, § 2, 1803 Tenn. Pub. Acts 44, 44. It is worth noting that Tennessee
continued to render trespass as trefpafs in 1803. Id. See supra text accompanying note 171. Typographic
evidence like the medial s in this statute suggests that at least Tennessee was still (somewhat) thinking
and writing in colonial terms.
200. Act of Nov. 3, 1803, § 2, 1803 Tenn. Pub. Law 44, 44.
201. Id. § 3. Corn should be understood to mean any grain crop. See infra note 226.
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Many colonial and early Republic statutes use trespass in the sense
of a wrong with touching. While hardly exceptional, these examples
of trespass as a wrong unconnected with entering private land
strengthen the conclusions in Part III.A. For example, Kentucky
listed “trespass for assault, menace, battery, wounding or
imprisonment” in a 1796 statute. 202 In the same year, Kentucky
enacted new procedural rules allowing information (instead of
indictment) for “trespass or misdemeanor.” 203 Five years later,
Kentucky authorized actions in trespass for thefts by administrators
and executors.204 Kentucky appears to have copied a Virginia statute
enacted in 1785 that allowed trespass in cases of theft by
administrators and executors.205
2. Hunting and Fishing on Other People’s Lands
Similarly, game laws that defined where hunters needed landowner
permission are evidence of where landowners had a right to exclude.
At ratification, only one state granted landowners any right to
exclude hunters from open land; six other states authorized hunting
on open land regardless of landowner permission. Hunting was not
an exception to a general law of trespass, but was more frequently
restricted since hunters were armed, their dogs often harassed
livestock, and their horses trampled crops. Virginia’s trespass law
restricted both hunting and fishing, the exception that demonstrates a
general rule that other public uses were unrestricted.
North Carolina was the only state that allowed landowners to
exclude hunters from unfenced land, but even that extraordinary
power was contingent on costly steps to notify the public. In 1784,
North Carolina imposed a fine on hunting with guns or dogs without

202. Act of Dec. 17, 1796, § 8, 1796 Ky. Acts 32, 34.
203. Act of Dec. 17, 1796, § 38, 1796 Ky. Acts 127, 132–33; see also Act of Dec. 17, 1796, § 7, 1796
Ky. Acts 137, 138 (limiting the jurisdiction of district courts in cases of “assault and battery, trespass
and actions of slander”).
204. Act of Feb. 24, 1797, § 55, 1797 Ky. Acts 162, 170.
205. Act of Jan. 1, 1787, § 53, 1785 Va. Acts 46, 50.
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landowner permission east of the Appalachian Mountains. 206
Landowners, however, were required to post their desire to exclude
in at least two public places.207 One of the two public places was
most often the county courthouse. Note that North Carolina’s hunting
trespass statute did not grant landowners the power to exclude those
who were not hunting. Fishers, foragers, and travelers remained free
to use open land, regardless of landowner permission. Fishing,
foraging, and even crossing private land were trespasses in England,
but none were proscribed by the North Carolina statute.
Pennsylvania’s colonial statute restricted hunting on fenced land,
but the preamble suggests that colonial Americans understood only
hunting on fenced land to impose on landowners. In 1760, the
colonial legislature of Pennsylvania responded to “divers abuses,
damages and inconveniences . . . by persons carrying, guns and
presuming to hunt on other people’s lands.”208 The statute penalized
hunting on “inclosed or improved lands” without permission. 209
Hunting on open land was not proscribed, regardless of landowner
permission.
The state legislature had been free to ban hunting on unfenced
land. Earlier, the legislature would have been unable to ban hunting
since the Pennsylvania constitution guaranteed that right. In 1760,
Pennsylvania was governed by the Charter of Privileges, also known
as the fourth Frame of Government. 210 The Charter included no
guarantee of a liberty to hunt on unfenced land, so the legislature was
free to proscribe hunting on private land, yet it chose to do so only in
a very limited manner.
In New York, nuisance hunting on fenced land drove the state
legislature to act. In New York, it had “long been the Practice of
great Numbers of idle and disorderly Persons” to hunt within New
York City, damaging crops and improvements to the “great Danger
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Act of 1784, ch. 33, 1784 N.C. Sess. Laws 364, 365.
Id.
Act of Apr. 9, 1760, § 6, 1760 Pa. Laws 227, 229.
Id. Fowling in the streets and gardens of Philadelphia was also proscribed. Id. § 7.
PA. CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES of 1701.
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of the Lives of his Majesty’s Subjects.” 211 In 1763, New York
banned hunting in orchards, gardens, and “other inclosed Land
whatsoever” within New York City without written landowner
permission.212 New York is an exception from the colonial norm in
that it required written permission, which is considerably more
difficult where paper and pencil were rare and some landowners were
illiterate. Landowners, lawful possessors, and their “white Servant or
Servants” were exempted.213 Like Pennsylvania, the preamble to the
New York statute listed a series of harms not limited to fenced land,
but limited the statute to fenced land.
Earlier in the eighteenth century, Maryland banned hunting with
dogs or guns on “Inclosed Grounds” without landowner
permission. 214 The Act extended to two other areas analogous to
fenced land. In addition to fenced land, hunters needed landowner
permission on islands or peninsulas “fenced across from Water to
Water.”215
Connecticut banned deer hunting without permission in any “Park
or Inclosure.” 216 Deer parks are fenced hunting preserves, which
were very popular in England.217 To recover under the Connecticut
act, courts were allowed to proceed under the looser rules from the
“Act for the more Effectual Detecting and Punishing Trespass.”218
In New Jersey, the colonial statute did not distinguish between
fenced and unfenced land, but instead between taxed and untaxed
land. In 1771, New Jersey proscribed carrying firearms on “[l]ands
not his own, and for which the Owner pays Taxes.”219 At the time,
211. Act of Dec. 20, 1763, 1763 N.Y. Laws 441, 441.
212. Id. at 442 (requiring a “License in Writing”).
213. Id.
214. 1728 Md. Laws 11, 13. Like many early Maryland statutes, the penalty was set in tobacco since
currency was very scarce. Id.
215. Id.
216. 1744 Conn. Pub. Acts 538, 539.
217. See EVELYN PHILIP SHIRLEY, SOME ACCOUNT OF ENGLISH DEER PARKS 11–12 (1867)
(referencing the number and locations of deer parks). The Domesday Book records thirty-one deer parks
in 1086. Id.
218. 1744 Conn. Pub. Acts 539, 539 (referring to 1726 Conn. Pub. Acts 329, 330).
219. Act of Dec. 21, 1771, 1771 N.J. Laws 343, 344. Driving deer with dogs on taxed land without
permission was also banned. Id.
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New Jersey taxed only improved land. 220 In colonial New Jersey,
fenced and improved lands would have been very nearly the same
thing. Fencing with split rails or stone is exhausting and expensive
work. No landowner would fence in any land that was not cultivated.
Since New Jersey was open range like every other colony, livestock
could roam freely without committing a trespass. Since landowners
had no remedy for crop loss, landowners would fence their crops to
protect them. Another provision of the same statute set property
qualifications for hunting on “waste and unimproved Lands,” 221
indicating the drafters did not think that § 1 proscribed hunting on
unimproved land.
Responding to commercial hunters, who took the hides but left the
meat to rot, South Carolina enacted a unique rule. Rotting meat
attracted wolves and angered Indians, neither of which South
Carolina wanted. In 1769, the colonial legislature of South Carolina
forbid hunting without landowner permission more than seven miles
from home.222 In 1818, the South Carolina high court interpreted this
statute in a dispute between a landowner and an unwanted hunter.
The court concluded that no landowner permission was necessary if
hunting within seven miles of home.223
Before independence, Virginia had revised its laws on landowner
permission and hunting several times. Early laws mimicked England,
granting the rich greater privileges, but those privileges did not
survive the mid-eighteenth century. 224 In 1792, Virginia banned
hunting and fishing within the “bounds of another person” without
landowner permission. 225 Although other Virginia statutes use the
220. Act of Dec. 6, 1769, 1769 N.J. Laws 317, 320 (setting rates for “[a]ll profitable Tracts of Land
held by Deed, Patent or Survey, whereon any Improvement is made”).
221. Act of Dec. 21, 1771, 1763 N.J. Laws 343, 345.
222. Act of Aug. 23, 1769, 1769 S.C. Acts 275–76. More than a century later, the seven-mile rule
remained law. S.C. REV. STAT. ch. LXXVII, § 15 at 403 (1873).
223. Id. at M’Conico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244, 246 (1818).
224. Act of Oct. 4, 1705, ch. 21, 3 HEN. ST. 304, 328 (1819) (no hunting without permission “upon the
lands . . . of any other person” except that owners of six or more slaves may pursue injured game
without permission); Act of Nov. 12, 1738, ch. 14, § 9, 5 HEN. ST. 60, 62–63 (1819) (no hunting without
permission on “patented lands”).
225. Act of Dec. 4, 1792, 1 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VA.: CONTINUATION OF HENING 78, 78–79.
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terms bounds in the modern sense (as a synonym for limit), 226 this
statute probably used the term to mean fence. Virginia codified its
laws three times before the Civil War, in 1819, 1849, and 1860. All
three codes incorporate the 1792 statute, but those in 1849 and 1860
refer to “enclosed bounds.” 227 In 1819, the marginalia refer to the
1792 statute, while the marginalia in 1849 and 1860 refer to the 1819
code. The codifiers of 1849 and 1860 give no indication that they
were changing the law. While the addition of “enclosed” might seem
to be the codifier’s error, the addition was not removed in 1860. That
the term enclosed was added, but not removed later, suggests that
Virginians understood the law only to restrict hunting on fenced land.
In 1866, Virginia enacted a new scheme for regulating hunting on
private land. 228 After 1866, the county government would decide
whether hunters needed landowner permission to hunt on private
land, regardless of whether it was fenced or not. If the county
government chose not to restrict hunting on unfenced land, the 1860
code remained in force.229
Only Virginia restricted fishing on private land. Other states that
required landowner permission for hunting did not require it for
fishing. Similarly, gathering or foraging was not restricted. Since
hunting, fishing, and gathering all remove something from the land,
the imposition on the landowner is greater. Merely entering or
crossing private land was unrestricted.
Massachusetts allowed the public to cross private land in two
colonial statutes. Massachusetts directly authorized people to hunt,
liable only for the damage caused. In 1636, the Plymouth Colony
enacted a statute that read “[t]hat fishing fowling hawking hunting be
226. Act of Dec. 4, 1795, § 3, 1795 Va. Acts 50, 50 (“all disputes concerning the bounds of lots”).
Also, “bounds” was used as a more general synonym for limits. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 24, 1795, § 10,
1795 Va. Acts 3, 4 (“every militia man removing out of the bounds of one company into another”); Act
of Oct. 21, 1793, 1793 Va. Acts 8, 13 (“go out of the rules or bounds of the prison”).
227. VA. CODE ch. 101, § 2 (1849); VA. CODE ch. 101, § 2 (1860). Another section of same chapter
prohibits hunting on private land near the water in three counties. VA. CODE ch. 101, § 4 (1860)
(prescribing fines for hunting and fishing “on the lands, or in the water courses comprehended within
the survey of any proprietor”).
228. Act of Feb. 20, 1866, ch. 93, 1865 Va. Acts 202, 202.
229. Id. § 3.
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freely allowed provided if any damage come to any p[ar]ticular
[person] by the prosecu[tion] of such game restitu[tion] be made or
the case actionable.”230
The other colony that became Massachusetts protected public
access slightly differently. In the 1640s, the Massachusetts Bay
colony enacted an ordinance that read “[a]nd for great ponds lying in
common, though within the bounds of some town, it shall be free for
any man to fish and fowl there, and may pass and repass on foot
through any man’s propriety for that end, so they trespass not upon
any man’s corn or meadow.”231 “Meadow” should not be understood
to describe unimproved land, even if cattle grazed on it. In colonial
America, meadow referred to improved land, most often used for
making hay for the cattle to overwinter.232 Crossing a field used for
grazing would not damage the grass, but crossing a meadow of hay
could damage it, by knocking the grass flat.
Except in North Carolina, landowners could not exclude the public
from open land. Even there, North Carolina replaced the English law
of trespass which did not require notice with posting statute that
required landowners to affirmatively communicate their intentions
before any remedy was available. In the remaining states, colonial
and early Republic statutes restricted hunting and fishing in a manner
as to demonstrate that entering open land without permission was not
a trespass in 1791.

230. Act of Nov. 15, 1636, II RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH IN NEW ENGLAND 16
(David Pulsifer ed., 1861) [hereinafter COLONIAL NEW PLYMOUTH].
231. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 68 (1851). It is unclear whether this ordinance
was enacted in 1641 or 1647, but the Supreme Judicial Court believes that §§ 1-3 were enacted in 1641,
while this section, § 4, was added in 1647. Id. at 67–68. Nantucket, Martha’s Vineyard, and the
Plymouth Bay Colony (southeastern Massachusetts and Cape Cod) were not part of the Massachusetts
Bay Colony. See id. at 76. The Supreme Judicial Court has held that the ordinance has become the
common law of property for the entire state. In re Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (Mass.
1974).
232. PERCY WELLS BIDWELL & JOHN IRONSIDE FALCONER, HISTORY OF AGRICULTURE IN THE
NORTHERN UNITED STATES 1620–1860 234 (1941). Additionally, corn should not be understood to
solely refer to maize, which was called Indian corn in the colonial era. Id. at 96, 240. Following the
English usage, corn refers to grain, so hunters and fishers were not allowed to cross (and damage) grain
crops. Although not strictly within the ordinance, other crops would have been protected.
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IV. THE DANGER FROM THIS HISTORICAL ERROR
The previous section has made it abundantly clear that the history
imbedded in Jones—that every unauthorized entry on land was a
trespass at Founding—is nonsense, but is it dangerous nonsense? This
final Part argues that the Jones historical embarrassment has the
potential to be dangerous nonsense, but most probably in fields other
than Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
A. Open Fields Forever
The majority opinion and concurrence in Jones duel on whether
the revival of trespass in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence threatens
the continued vitality of the open fields doctrine.233 There are several
reasons to believe that Jones does not threaten the open fields
doctrine. Firstly, the majority opinion expressly holds that Jones does
not overrule Oliver. 234 The majority opinion holds that the Fourth
Amendment addresses searches and seizures of “persons, houses,
papers and effects,” not of land or property generally.235
But, doctrine is malleable, so the ultimate question is not whether a
few sentences in Jones point this way or that, but whether there is an
appetite to overrule Oliver. There is little indication at present that
the U.S. Supreme Court or other courts want to overrule the open
fields doctrine, so the Justices’ nonchalant approach to history could
be of no import to the scope of the Fourth Amendment. 236 But
doctrinal innovations often have their largest impact where the
experts least expect.
B. Where Trespass Law Matters
While it may be surprising that Jones could have its largest impact
in regulatory takings jurisprudence, it should surprise no one that
233.
234.
235.
236.
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trespass matters most for property law. The same Supreme Court that
is willing to constitutionalize erroneous trespass law in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence may be willing to do the same in its
takings jurisprudence.
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from doing an
assortment of things, including taking “private property . . . for public
use, without just compensation.”237 Initially, only actual deprivations
of property were proscribed. In the 1920s, however, an antiregulatory Supreme Court invented the doctrine of regulatory takings
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 238 Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Holmes held that “if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.”239 As a doctrine, regulatory takings cannot
be justified on originalist grounds. There is ample evidence that the
Founders were familiar with regulation that limited land use both to
prevent nuisance and to further public goals. As Professor Hart has
shown, the reason that the Takings Clause does not mention
regulation is that the Framers “did not regard regulation as a form of
taking.”240
Colonial land use regulation was intrusive, dictating to landowners
how much, how little, and in what ways landowners could use their
property. Taken together, colonial governments imposed
comprehensive land use planning. In many colonies, landowners who
failed to improve their land would forfeit their title to the land, even
if the condition of clearing the land and settling on it was not
included in the original grant.241 Similarly, if a landowner let their

237. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
238. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
239. Id. at 415.
240. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1258 (1996) [hereinafter Hart, Colonial]; John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early
Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1100–01 (2000)
[hereinafter Hart, Early Republic]; John F. Hart, Fish, Dams, and James Madison: Eighteenth-Century
Species Protection and the Original Understanding of the Takings Clause, 63 MD. L. REV. 287, 287–89
(2004) [hereinafter Hart, Fish].
241. Hart, Colonial, supra note 240, at 1260–61 (describing laws in Delaware, Massachusetts, and
New York).
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land lay fallow, the landowner could forfeit their land.242 Many cities
imposed parallel requirements on urban landowners, obligating them
to maintain, and in some cases build, their residences. 243 In four
colonies, statutes imposed fines on landowners who failed to fence
their land. 244 The onus on landowners with valuable minerals was
even greater. If a landowner failed to exploit minerals, the landowner
forfeited the mine and another could work it. 245 Connecticut went
even further, imposing forfeiture if landowners did not exploit the
resource as quickly as possible, allowing another miner to eject the
landowner.246
Colonial legislatures treated other natural resources they
considered as important and valuable as minerals similarly. At least
two colonial legislatures allowed someone to claim a site capable of
producing water power if the landowner did not develop the site.247
Laws requiring a particular economic use were not limited to
minerals or water power. Many colonies compelled landowners to
drain their land, often in a collective enterprise where the costs were
shared regardless of individuals’ willingness to do so.248 While some
landowners benefited from drainage, others were harmed. Riparian
meadows produced hay and grazing with minimal effort. 249
Compelled drainage reduced the value of marshland and obviously
interfered with what the Supreme Court dubbed landowner’s

242. Id. at 1262–63 (describing laws in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia).
243. Id. at 1275–79 (discussing laws in Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, and Virginia).
244. Id. at 1264–65 (describing laws in Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and South Carolina).
245. Id. at 1265 (describing laws in Plymouth Colony).
246. Id. at 1265–66.
247. Hart, Colonial, supra note 240, at 1267 (describing Mill Acts in Maryland and New Hampshire).
248. Id. at 1268–69 (describing laws in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina).
249. Id. at 1269–70 & n.111; see also JOHN R. STILGOE, COMMON LANDSCAPE OF AMERICA, 1540 TO
1845 46 (1983) (settlements were located near marsh and meadow); A Brief Account of the Province of
East-Jersey, in America, in SAMUEL SMITH, THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY OF NOVA-CAESARIA, OR
NEW JERSEY app. at 540 (Burlington, NJ., James Parker 1765) (marsh and meadow were used to lure
settlers).
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“reasonable investment backed expectations.”250 Colonial legislatures
often chose one use over another.
Like today, cities and towns in colonial times imposed a variety of
obligations on landowners to promote development in line with
municipal goals. In some colonies, laws required density in towns,
but other towns discouraged density.251 Many towns imposed vague
aesthetic standards, hoping to make the city more attractive.252 Some
towns required landowners to remove all the vegetation from their
parcels, while others required planting trees.253
These restrictions and obligations on landowners were so
widespread that it is implausible to describe them as exceptions.254
Additionally, it is demonstrably false that landowners faced no limits
except nuisance.255 It is also abundantly clear that the Framers did not
object to land use regulation practices. After independence, the states
(or towns with state approval) continued to regulate in detail the
aesthetics of new buildings. 256 Towns continued to dictate to
landowners whether vegetation was allowed.257
Historical evidence notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has
expanded its regulatory takings jurisprudence in the recent decades
and came close to constitutionalizing the doctrine of judicial takings.
Most famously, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the government cannot require a private landowner to

250. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1877).
251. Hart, Colonial, supra note 240, at 1275 (discussing laws in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, and New York).
252. Id. at 1275–77 (discussing laws in Connecticut, New York, and Virginia).
253. Id. at 1280–81 (discussing laws in New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, and Virginia).
254. Id. at 1281.
255. Id. at 1281; see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (describing only
limitations on landowners as “background principles of nuisance and property law”).
256. Hart, Early Republic, supra note 240, at 1108–15 (describing laws in Connecticut, Georgia,
Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia). These restrictions did
impinge on individual preferences. Jefferson complained of the “disgusting monotony” where every
building was the same distance from the street. Jefferson’s Draft of Agenda for the Seat of Government
(Aug. 29, 1790), in 17 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 460, 461 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1965).
257. Hart, Early Republic, supra note 240, at 1115–16 (describing laws in Connecticut, North
Carolina, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Virginia).
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provide public access. 258 Like Mahon, Kaiser Aetna cannot be
justified on originalist grounds since every colony allowed the public
to enter unfenced private land in 1791.
While Kaiser Aetna is now well-settled law, regulatory takings
doctrine is poised for a dangerous eruption. In Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental
Protection, four justices joined an opinion finding a judicial
taking.259 Judicial takings is a doctrine that judicial decisions can take
property by changing settled precedents, much like an action by the
legislature or the executive. Although it would not be controversial to
say that a court cannot expropriate property for its own use, the
application of takings doctrine to the common law process of legal
evolution is revolutionary.
The combination of judicial takings and ignorance about trespass
law in 1791 could destabilize property law in several states. At
common law, landowners owned coastal land from the high water
mark, and public rights of access to coastal land extended to the wet
sand. The Oregon Supreme Court has held that the dry sand is a
public highway and therefore open to the public.260 In a subsequent
case, the Oregon Supreme Court found no taking since public access
was a “background principle[] of state law.”261 Justice Scalia (with
Justice O’Connor joining) penned a five-page dissent from the denial
of certiorari for the case.262 Scalia’s dissent makes it abundantly clear
how he would decide the case (i.e., against public access).
Additionally, he would have found that the Oregon Supreme Court
258. 444 U.S. 164, 389, 393 (1979). The Court expanded its ruling in Kaiser Aetna in two subsequent
cases where government required public access in exchange for permission to build. Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
259. 560 U.S. 702, 707–13 (2010). Roberts, Thomas, and Alito concurred in Parts II and III of
Scalia’s opinion, which concluded that a court takes property when its decision changes the boundaries
of private rights. Id.
260. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (Or. 1969) (noting that public had enjoyed use
of dry sand “since the beginning of the state’s political history”).
261. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456 (Or. 1993) (en banc) (citing Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1004 (1992)).
262. Id. at 1207 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Scalia presumed to correct the Oregon
Supreme Court on what he deemed a misreading of its own precedent. Id. at 1210–11 n.3. Further, he
accused Oregon of “invoking nonexistent rules of state substantive law.” Id. at 1211.
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had effected a judicial taking. 263 Similarly, the Hawaii Supreme
Court has interpreted its property law in a way that arguably expands
public access at the expense of the landowner’s right to exclude.264
Additionally, landowners in Hawaii cannot exclude native Hawaiians
from customary use of unimproved land.265
Hawaii and Oregon are not the only states where judicial decisions
have created public rights of access to private land. In recent decades,
several states have expanded the public right of access. The New
Jersey Supreme Court has expanded access to the shoreline, holding
that it is “not limited to the ancient prerogatives of navigation and
fishing, but extend[s] as well to recreational uses, including bathing,
swimming and other shore activities.”266 In Arkansas, for example,
the state definition of navigability was expanded, enlarging the scope
of public access to streams and rivers. 267 In South Carolina, the
navigable channel includes improvements and artificial
expansions.268 In Illinois, the public can boat on lakes too small for
navigation.269 In many eastern states, only navigable waters are open
to the public because that is the law of England. 270 Private
landowners own the streambed but have no right to exclude from the
waters, arguably restricting their common law rights.
In several western states, public rights are even stronger, since the
public can walk through the channel. In Wyoming and South Dakota,
the river channel is open to the public, regardless of its navigability

263. Id. at 1212.
264. In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 78 (Haw. 1968) (delimiting private from public according to native
Hawaiian custom).
265. See Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Cnty. Planning Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1259–61,
1267–68 (Haw. 1995).
266. Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972).
267. See State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 664–65 (Ark. 1980) (noting that navigability includes
both recreation and commerce).
268. State v. Head, 498 S.E.2d 389, 394–95 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (stating “[a]rtificial lakes along
navigable streams” are open to the public). But see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178–79
(1979) (stating that improvements do not expand access).
269. Beacham v. Lake Zurich Prop. Owners Ass’n, 526 N.E.2d 154, 157 (Ill. 1988).
270. Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 51–52.
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and even when the seasonal flow has disappeared.271 Anyone is free
to hike up the streambed, regardless of who owns the land. In
Montana and the Dakotas, all water is open to the public.272 Public
uses of water, such as fishing, is part of the fabric of Montana
culture.273
In South Dakota, the public retains the right to hunt along section
lines, even where there is no recognizable road. 274 Section lines
divide parcels governed by the general land survey. When
landowners acquired the parcels, the section lines were reserved for
public roads. Since very few of those roads were built, most of the
section lines are boundaries between private landowners or between
different parcels of a single landowner. South Dakota allows public
hunting along certain roads and extends that right to section lines
where a roadway was reserved but never built.275
All of these states expand public access—at the expense of the
landowner’s right to exclude. All these laws are threatened by the
Supreme Court’s willingness to impose a mistaken view of what
trespass law was in 1791.
All of these states’ laws and decisions are also threatened by the
doctrine of judicial takings. In each case, substantial time passed
between the state’s formation and the first decision announcing the
principle of public access. In Oregon, for example, public use of the
dry sand was the common practice since first settlement, but no law
validated the custom until the 1890s.276 In 1892, the Oregon Supreme
Court held that federal patents extended only to the “high-water”

271. See Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 838–39 (S.D. 2004); Day v. Amstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 143
(Wyo. 1961).
272. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984); Roberts v.
Taylor, 181 N.W. 622, 625–26 (N.D. 1921); Flisrand v. Madson, 152 N.W. 796, 800–01 (S.D. 1915).
273. See NORMAN MACLEAN, A RIVER RUNS THROUGH IT (1976) (depicting a Montana father who
relates to his sons through fly fishing).
274. Tom Simmons, Comment, Highways, Hunters and Section Lines: Tensions Between Public
Access and Private Rights, 2 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 240, 241 (1997).
275. Id. at 41.
276. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673–74 (Or. 1969) (noting that the public had
enjoyed use of dry sand “since the beginning of the state’s political history”).
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line, which was defined as the vegetation line.277 Seven years later,
the Oregon legislature confirmed the substance of the decision by
holding that Oregon beaches are a public highway.278 But, Oregon
was organized in 1848 and admitted to statehood in 1859. That gap
between the beginning of the state’s political existence and the first
legal decisions is the pretext that judicial activists might use. These
fears are justified. Dissenting from a denial of certiorari related to the
Oregon’s beaches, Justice Scalia derides the Oregon Supreme Court
for invoking “nonexistent rules” of state law. 279 Justice Scalia
criticizes the Oregon Supreme Court for misreading Blackstone,280
but omits any reference to the 1894 U.S. Supreme Court case that
validated Oregon’s beach property laws.
Since the Jones-ians assume that every state inherited the law of
England in toto, every decision adjusting property law is liable to be
labeled a judicial taking and thus constitutionally proscribed. Aside
from the historical error, there are two great harms that arise when
English trespass law is constitutionalized in the United States and
combined with the doctrine of regulatory or judicial takings. The first
is that the public could lose important rights, rights that we have
enjoyed for centuries. In many cases, these rights are an important
link to a cultural roots threatened by assimilation. 281 There is a
second harm, since it would represent the federalization of property
law. As the most inherently local of all law, the states are generally
given great deference in developing their property law. The move

277. Bowlby v. Shively, 30 P. 154, 156 (Or. 1892), aff’d, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
278. Act of Jan. 25, 1899, 1898 Or. Laws 3, 3 (“That the shore of the Pacific ocean, between ordinary
high and extreme low tides, and from the Columbia river on the north to the south boundary line of
Clatsop county on the south, is hereby declared a public highway, and shall forever remain open as such
to the public.”).
279. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1211 (1994).
280. Id. at 1212 n.5. In addition to Blackstone, Scalia quotes two eighteenth century English cases and
one early nineteenth century case from New York. Id. at 1212–13 n.5. Scalia does not appear to
acknowledge that the Oregon Supreme Court decides what the common law (including the common law
of custom) is in Oregon. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71, 83 (1938).
281. See, e.g., Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Planning Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1259–61,
1269 (1995) (finding that strictly applying English common law would preclude traditional Hawaiian
gathering rights).
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would federalize property and mark the second coming of Lochner,
this time in property, not contract.282
While Jones suggests that some justices are ready to impose their
imagined version of eighteenth century tort law on constitutional law,
the threat is larger than public access. Regulatory takings have been a
vehicle for judicial activism and anti-democratic, regulatory secondguessing since the doctrine’s invention in 1922.283 The true history of
property regulation in the eighteenth century indicates that the
Founders believed that government could regulate property. Yet,
regulatory takings opinions like Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Commission state that landowners faced no restrictions, which is
demonstrably false. If the same faux originalism that animates Jones
combines with ahistorical activism of judicial takings doctrine, much
of the property, environmental, and urban regulation that underpins
modernity is threatened.284
Property rights at common law are often an argument against
environmental protection. While the term may be novel, the practice
of environmental regulation is not. Dams were important sources of
water power in early America but they obstructed the migration of
spawning fish. At common law, the owner of the dam had no
obligation to alter their dam to allow fish to pass.285 In 1791, nine
states had laws requiring dam owners to modify or remove their

282. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 1–2 (2011) (arguing that Lochner is unfairly misconstrued and federal
courts should restrict regulation to protect or expand private property rights); Eric R. Claeys, Response,
Exclusion and Private Law Theory: A Comment on Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV.
F. 133, 144 (2012) (arguing that the right to exclude does not describe property and that property must
include broader rights of use, alienation, and possession); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the
Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 440 (2003) (arguing that the right to exclude is a proregulation artifact of the Legal Realist movement and arguing that courts should protect broader rights
of use, enjoyment, and alienation).
283. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that compensation is required when a
regulation “goes too far”).
284. Note that most of the property and environmental regulations from the colonial era and Early
Republic would not survive either.
285. Obstructing the passage of fish was not an offense at common law. Commonwealth v. Knowlton,
2 Mass. (2 Tyng) 530, 535 (1807). According to Blackstone, only obstructions of navigable waterways
were public nuisances at common law. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *167.
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dams to allow fish to pass.286 Some of these laws were quite extreme,
requiring that dams be destroyed, and providing for no
compensation.287 These laws should not be understood as a limited or
incomplete commitment to private property rights generally. Nine
states required compensation for land taken for roads.288
James Madison is largely credited with drafting the Fifth
Amendment and introducing the amendment, since none of the state
ratifying conventions called for it. 289 The same James Madison
introduced a bill in Virginia to require dams to allow fish passage,
without providing for landowner compensation.290 The Framers thus
intended to distinguish actual takings of land, where title passes from
a private landowner to the government, from regulations that limited
the use of that land.
The historical evidence is clear that entering unfenced land was not
a trespass and that regulating property was not a taking in 1791. It is
equally clear that faux originalism often leads to outcomes directly in
conflict with the best historical research. The danger from Jones,
particularly in light of the novel doctrine of judicial takings, is that a
small number of mistaken, but motivated, judges will seize power
from the more democratic branches of government.
CONCLUSION
Both the majority and concurring opinions in Jones are wrong
about the state of the law in 1791. In the United States, landowners
had no right to exclude others from open land. No eighteenth century
case shows a remedy for mere entry. Two states, Vermont and
Pennsylvania, constitutionally guaranteed a right to not only enter but
286. Hart, Fish, supra note 240, at 313. By 1800, thirteen states had laws requiring dam owners to
modify their dams to allow fish to pass. Id. at 292.
287. Id. at 294 & nn.47–48.
288. Id. at 309. Even where the law did not require compensation, payment to affected landowners
was common. See id. at 313 (“Eight . . . states observed the compensation principle even in taking
unimproved land for highways”).
289. Hart, Early Republic, supra note 240, at 1132.
290. Hart, Fish, supra note 240, at 305–306.
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to hunt on open land. Several other state legislatures authorized
hunting on unfenced land, implying that the public had a general
right to enter unfenced land.
Regardless of whether a Fourth Amendment search requires a
trespass or the violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy, the
government can explore open land without a search warrant. While
the error in Jones does not affect the outcome in the case, it is
nonetheless distressing because the Supreme Court does not
recognize the limits of its historical knowledge. All but one of the
justices joined opinions that relied, at least in part, on historical errors
found in a modern treatise. Rather than recognize their limits, the
Supreme Court is poised to make the same mistake again and in a
case where it will matter: regulatory and judicial takings.
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